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ABSTRACT 
The Comprehensive Australian Study of Entrepreneurial Emergence (CAUSEE) is the first 
Australian research to employ the large scale, longitudinal research originally developed for the Panel 
Study of Entrepreneurial Dynamics (PSED) (Reynolds, 2007.) In recognition of PSED-type random 
samples being dominated by imitative low potential ventures (non “high potentials”: non HP), 
CAUSEE employed a methodology using novel criteria to develop theoretically representative samples 
of the “high potential” (HP) firms. 
This paper presents preliminary results of the CAUSEE research. Comparing HPs with other 
firms, HPs spend a longer time in gestation, are more often created by teams, are male dominated, have 
higer use of outside advisors, venture capital and angel investment and exhibit more 
internationalisation activity. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 All firm start ups do not contribute uniformly within an economy. Some new ventures are 
more important than others in terms of their contribution and growth within business environments.  
Birch (1997) found that truly significant contributions to the economy are made by the fast growing 
HP “gazelle’’ firms rather than other less ambitious or capable firms. This second category of firm is 
often imitative type firms and includes “Mom and Pop” lifestyle businesses that start small and remain 
intendedly small (Cooper 1981; Timmons, 1986; Cooper et al 2004.) Further, Gallagher and Miller 
(1991) studied the formation and performance of 2,600 new small firms in two regions of U.K. and 
based on performance they classified  two cohorts of firms, high performers (high flyers) and low 
performers (sinkers.)  The researchers argue (Gallagher and Miller 1991:100): “It is the high flying 
firms which create the jobs. The remarkable effect of a modest number of high flying firms on 
employment and turnover has been very clearly shown.” Furthermore, media, research policy, 
government agenda and industry tend to focus on the high achievers- those highly successful 
entrepreneurs (e.g. Richard Branson) or high impact firms or “gazelles” (Birch 1984) that have the 
opportunity to make disproportionate contributions to the economy to innovation, job creation and 
regional economic well-being (Acs and Audretsch 1990; Davidsson, Lindmark et al. 1994; Reynolds 
1994; Davidsson, Lindmark et al. 1998; Acs and Mueller 2008.)  
  
 
There are thus good reasons to learn more about this important category of firm. However, 
because of their small numbers and the problem of identifying them at an early stage the amount of 
systematic, research-based knowledge about them is limited. This is particularly true for their early 
stages of development. Therefore, what we aim to contribute in this paper is a descriptive analysis of 
emerging and young high potential businesses in Australia. To this end we use data from the 
Comprehensive Australian Study of Entrepreneurial Emergence (CAUSEE.)  
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 LITERATURE REVIEW 
When studying HP nascent or very young firms, the first challenge becomes the definition of 
what “high potentials” are and the application of this term to specific industries.  Research in nascent 
entrepreneurship has evolved whereby high technology or high innovation is often synonymous with 
HP firms.  Research has evaluated innovative vs. imitative firms (Samuelsson 2001), high technology 
vs. moderate and low technology ventures (Liao and Welsch 2003; Gans and Stern 2000), knowledge 
intensive firms (Giarmartino, McDougall and Bird (1993) and high growth potential firms (Davidsson 
and Henrekson 2002; Hoang and Antoncic 2003.) Crick and Spence (2005) argue that different 
definitions exist within these classifications (e.g. high technology).  Further, HP research often tends to 
focus on specific industries i.e. high technology (e.g. software, biotechnology).   
  
Increasing focus has shifted towards knowledge intensive research based start ups and the 
evaluation of high technology firms (Heirman and Clarysse 2004.)  These research firms have been 
found to contribute an important role in bringing new technologies to the market (Christensen 1997.)  
However, contrary to anecdotal evidence, successful business comes from a variety of industries and 
circumstances (Henrekson and Johnsson 2008) and research indicates rapid growth firms can be found 
in labour as well as knowledge intensive industries, and in both manufacturing and service industries 
(Davidsson and Delmar 1997, Wiklund 1998.) Research in HP firms often misses those novel 
innovative firms in less dynamic, mature industries.  This research seeks to overcome these issues 
through the development of the HP judgement sample of firms. 
 
Two conceptual dimensions can be identified when defining HP young and nascent firms.  
The first dimension deals with the expectations of the entrepreneur and future growth of the firm.  
Literature identifies expectations of the entrepreneur and future growth of the firm.  This literature ties 
in with expectations of potential returns, including high expectation entrepreneurs (Timmons 1986) 
and application to different processes including internationalisation (Timmons 1986; Bloodgood et al 
1996) and innovation and economic growth (Wong and Autio 2005.)  It also has links with 
entrepreneurial cognition and overconfidence (Koellinger, Minniti and Schade 2007; Wickham 2006.) 
               
The second dimension is aligned with strategy and resource based view of the firm (RBV) 
literature (Barney 1991.) It argues there are a combination of resources and their application to specific 
markets through venture creation processes that lead to specific above average outcomes.  Explicit in 
this approach is the focus on performance/growth and firm outcomes – e.g. financial outcomes seen 
through disproportionate higher levels of sales or employment.  In this approach, HPs are those firms 
that possess valuable, unique, nonsubstitutional resources that assist the firm to develop distinct 
strategic competitive advantages from which to to leverage further growth and profitability (Eisenhardt 
and Martin 2000.)  This literature concentrates on young firms that have produced tangible outcomes 
and consider high impact firms and themes of innovation, occupational choice, human capital, venture 
capital, endogenous growth, knowledge spillovers, capital markets, entrepreneurial rents, and 
individual traits. (Acs 2008.)   
  
This research defines new “high-potential,” ventures as new entrepreneurial innovative 
ventures with high aspirations and potential for high growth. This distinguishes them from those non 
HP businesses that start small and are likely to remain small (Timmons, 1986.)  Non HP firms may 
either have low aspirations or low potential for high growth.   
 
CAUSEE  RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
Before outlining the methodology developed for this HP research, it is first necessary to 
explain the broader CAUSEE methodological context in which it sits.  With close synergies with the 
PSED (Reynolds et al 1994,  Reynolds, 2007; Reynolds and Curtin, 2008) CAUSEE aims to 
understand the relationships and the interactions of the venture creation process, resources, the 
opportunity, the environment and resulting firm outcomes (ref figure 1).  
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While relying on data collected from (one of) the founder(s), CAUSEE seeks to evaluate 
these processes at the firm level. This is why no “box” labelled “Individual” appears in Figure 1  – 
from a firm level perspective the knowledge and motivation of the founder(s) represents resources at 
the venture’s disposal.  
 
Therefore, CAUSEE positions the founders and founding teams as one of the important 
resources that determine the fate of the venture. This is unlike much research in venture creation that 
evaluates the individual or founding teams (Liao and Welsch 2004; Shane and Venkataraman 2000; 
Shaver 1995.) 
  
METHOD 
The main sample 
After comprehensive questionnaire development work, a version of the survey instrument was 
pre-tested on a convenience sample of 71 nascent and young businesses in Nov.-Dec., 2006. After 
analysis, re-design, programming and internal testing a full scale pilot test with computer aided 
telephone interviewing (CATI) using a random digit dialling (RDD) procedure was commissioned to 
TNS and undertaken in April-May, 2007. This pilot test included contact with some 1,810 Australian 
households for a yield of 78 nascent- or young firm founders who also completed the full interview 1 
After further testing and re-design the large scale screening for eligible cases started in early July 2007 
and continued into April, 2008. In the main study, a total of 28,383 adults (with equal male/female 
representation) in the randomly selected households completed a screening interview. In order to 
qualify for inclusion as NF or YF spokesperson the respondent first had to answer affirmatively to at 
least one of the following questions: 
1.  Are you, alone or with others, currently trying to start a new business, including any self-
employment or selling any goods or services to others? 
2.  Are you, alone or with others, currently trying to start a new business or a new venture 
for your employer, an effort that is part of your normal work? 
3.  Are you, alone or with others currently the owner of a business you help manage, 
including self-employment or selling any goods or services to others? 
Both categories of respondents also had to confirm that they were (or intended to be) owners 
or part owners of the (emerging) firm. Further, for the NF category they had to confirm they had 
undertaken some concrete “start-up behaviour” such as looking for equipment or a location, organizing 
a start-up team, and working on a business plan, etc., within the last 12 months. Otherwise, or else they 
were deemed under qualified. Conversely, if they confirmed that the firm’s revenues had exceeded 
expenses for six of the last 12 months they were deemed over qualified (and instead tested for 
eligibility in the YF category). Finally, the preliminary YF cases were retained if they confirmed that 
they started “trading in the market doing the type of business you are currently doing” in 2004 or later. 
   
In the random sample, this process yielded  977 Nascent Firms (3.4%) and 1,011 Young 
Firms (3.6%). These were directed to the full length interview (40-60 minutes) either directly 
following the screener or later by appointment. The full length interviews were completed by 594 NF 
and 514 YF cases to be used in our analyses. 
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The HP over sample 
 Traditionally, finding nascent firms in sufficient quantities has been a daunting challenge. To 
identify “high potential” businesses at an early stage for the purpose of comparing their characteristics 
with “regular” start-ups is a very challenging task Aldrich (1999.)   As previously mentioned, there is 
no agreed-upon definition of “high potential” businesses (Crick and Spence 2005.) Second, by any 
meaningful definition they are rare, so obtaining a sizeable sample of them is even more difficult than 
is sampling “regular” start-ups at an early stage (before they appear in any registers) (Reynolds, 
1997;Wong et al 2005.) A random sample of start-ups will, of course, include a proportion of HP start-
ups; however, when a sufficiently demanding HP definition is employed that proportion is likely to be 
small Reynolds and Miller (1992.) Obtaining a large enough random sample of such entities may 
therefore be impossible or prohibitive in terms of costs. On the other hand, if they are identified 
through a single type of source (e.g., business incubators; business angel networks) the sample would 
almost certainly be biased compared to the theoretical category the study intends to investigate. Third, 
no single criterion (e.g., founders’ track record; booming industry; being highly innovative) can with 
satisfactory accuracy determine whether or not a start-up has “high potential” (Gundry and Welsch 
2001.)  
Fourth, there is no natural dividing line between HP and non-HP businesses; in order to 
delineate such groups an arbitrary cut-off has to be introduced in what is truly a continuous distribution 
of varying potential. Hence, there is no “right” or “perfect” way to obtain a group of HP start-ups. No 
matter how it is done, a proportion of those defined as HPs will fail or show rather pedestrian 
development while some start-ups not defined as HPs will become successful and significant business 
entities. However, early definition of a group of HPs that eventually turn out to be markedly over 
represented among high performers should be possible.   
  
Recognising some of the challenges with this cohort, we sought to identify a diverse sample 
of HP nascent firms. A variety of techniques were also employed to develop a multi level dataset of 
sources to develop leads and firm details.  This dataset was generated from a variety of websites 
including major stakeholders including the Federal and State Governments, Australian Chamber of 
Commerce, University Commercialisation Offices, Patent and Trademark Attorneys, Government 
Awards and Industry Awards in Entrepreneurship and Innovation, Industry lead associations, Venture 
Capital Association, innovation directories including Australian Technology Showcase, Business and 
Entrepreneurs Magazines including BRW and Anthill. The use of many different sources serves to 
minimise any particular bias in the sample. 
  
In total, over 480 industry association, government and award sources were generated in this 
process.  Of these, 74 discrete sources generated HPs that fulfilled the criteria. The “suspected” HP 
cases were subjected to an expanded, multiple customised screening based on prior literature using a 
combination of criteria relating to: 
1.  Human capital (education, management experience, and start-up experience) 
2.  Aspirations (growth orientation)  
3. Technological sophistication and novelty (innovation; IP protection); and being in a “growth 
friendly” industry 
 
A compensatory scoring system was developed such that no particular characteristic was 
necessary for HP status whereas a predefined total score had to be reached across the dimensions. 
Cases that reached this pre-defined total score were included in the study and subjected to the full 
length interview. The criteria for distinguishing between NF and YF were the same as in the random 
sample.   In the oversample, 1116 firms were contacted as HP cases.  331 cases agreed to participate in 
the screener, with 279 firms (134 nascents, and 140 young firms) successfully passing the HP criteria.  
222 Firms (108 Nascents and 113 Young firms) completed the full interview. 
 
The HP and non HP cases contrasted in this report  
             
One possible approach for analysing the distinctive characteristics of HP start-ups would be to 
compare the over sample just discussed with the random sample. However, such an approach would 
have certain disadvantages. First, as noted above a random sample will include a proportion of cases 
that also satisfy our HP criteria. This would blur the theoretical categories being compared. Second, 
preliminary analyses suggested this proportion was higher than expected (approx. 20%). This indicates 
that the original cut-off for HP eligibility may have been too lenient.  
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For the purpose of this report we decided to follow a slightly different approach. We raised the 
cut-off so that no more than approximately 10 percent of the random sample would reach it. We then 
combined the over sample cases that satisfied this stricter criterion (135 out of 222) with the randomly 
selected cases that also satisfied the stricter criterion (127 out of 1186) resulting in a total HP sample of 
262 cases. Of the HPs, 155 are nascent firms and the remaining 107 are Young Firms. These will be 
contrasted with “regular” (or non-HP) start-ups, that is, those 1059 cases in the random sample that do 
not fulfill HP criteria. 
           
 Further preliminary analyses revealed that although the HPs drawn from the random and 
judgment samples both fulfill the same minimum criteria, the sub-group drawn from the judgment 
sample is in many respects more “distinct” or “extreme” than their randomly selected counterparts. 
However, by combining the two HP subgroups we argue we obtain a theoretically meaningful sample 
of HPs. This sample will be compared to a likewise theoretically meaningful group of non-HPs. While 
HP vs. non-HP differences are often smaller when only cases from the random sample are compared 
the differences we comment on are still substantial in such a comparison unless otherwise stated. 
            
Using non-randomly sampled cases and multiple criteria for HP definition has some negative 
consequences. First, HPs will be different by definition from non-HP start-ups on all criteria included 
in the HP screener. Therefore, we report such differences as “sample descriptions” rather than as 
“findings”. We will also be cautious with differences regarding characteristics that were not included 
as HP screener criteria but which more or less by necessity are correlated with them. Second, both this 
dependence on sampling criteria and the inclusion of non-randomly sampled cases make statistical 
tests ambiguous. Although we have employed such testing to make sure we do not over interpret 
results that could easily have occurred by chance we are aware that conditions for strict applicability of 
statistical inference are not fulfilled.  
 
Importantly, CAUSEE employs the firm or “venture” as the focal level of analysis. This means, 
for example, that years of experience is calculated across all founders for team start-ups, and that the 
presence of this or that education or experience based knowledge means that any member of the 
founding team has it; not necessarily the respondent. 
Table 1. Sample description 
 Nascent Firms (NF) Young Firms (YF) 
 High 
Potential 
Other High 
Potential 
Other 
Gender (female) 19 48 19 44 
Uni education (1 or more of owners have), % 65 44 75 41 
Prior start-up experience, % 82 53 83 43 
Management experience, (median yrs) 20 10 20 10 
Parent’s Owned a Business 62 59 67 54 
Expected revenue in 5 years (median) 6,000,000 100,000 7,750,000 120,000 
Exp. No. of employees in 5 yrs (med.) 20 2 20 2 
Max growth pref. to manageable size, % 90 15 83 12 
Sees R&D spending as major priority, % 77 40 80 22 
Perceives firm as high-tech, % 66 26 69 24 
Has applied for IP protection, % 48 6 57 9 
Novelty in venture idea (12 pt. scale) 5.5 3.6 5.2 2.2 
Industry: Manufacturing, % 23 7 16 4 
Industry: Communications, % 8 4 9 4 
Industry: Business consulting, % 10 8 18 14 
Industry: Retailing, % (not criterion) 5 18 5 10 
 
Table 1 reports some of the differences between HPs and other start-ups along those criteria that 
were used to define the groups. As can be seen, the HP group seems to have much more education, 
experience and technological sophistication. They also have much higher aspirations. The median 
values for expected future size may not impress everybody in an absolute sense, but in relation to other 
start-ups they are massive and the HP medians not being even higher reflects that very few businesses 
grow to significant size at young age. The fact that YFs tend to be more modest than NFs on several 
criteria suggests the HPs aspirations are over- rather than under stated.  
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Let us here also comment on a number of differences that are indirectly (and not fully 
deterministically) driven by the HP definition criteria. Although not an explicit criterion the HP group 
also has much more industry experience than non-HP start ups (median 20 vs. 8.5 years for NFs and 24 
vs. 10 years for YFs; i.e., the median difference is even greater than for management experience). 
According to some previous research this may be a major contributor to their eventual success 
(Wagner, 2004). The YF vs. NF difference we find in our data is in line with that notion. The higher 
levels of education and experience also translate to a range of functional areas. HPs report much more 
experience in all functional fields (sales/marketing; finance/accounting; administration/human resource 
management; industry-specific product/service development and production/service delivery 
knowledge). Education-based knowledge is also higher for HPs, but not impressively so as regards 
sales/marketing and administration/HRM. Given the high proportion of manufacturing firms among 
the HPs it is hardly surprising that a much higher proportion in that category has a product rather than 
a service focus. Among HPs 68 percent of the NFs and 59 percent of the YFs (intend to) mainly sell 
products. The corresponding figures for non-HPs are 45 and 30 percent, respectively.  
Given their other characteristics it is hardly surprising that more money has been invested in the 
HPs than in other start-ups. In about half of the cases (46% for NFs and 52% for YFs) the HPs have 
invested $100,000 or more so far. The corresponding shares for non-HPs are 9 and 16 percent, 
respectively. Although this result is not driven by sampling criteria it may not surprise that HPs have 
higher (intended) proportion of their sales generated online. Given the low proportion of retailers 
among HPs such a result is not a given, although it does turn out to be the case for NFs. Among 
nascent HPs the proportion intending to have at least half of their revenue generated via the Internet is 
40 percent. The corresponding figure for nascent non-HPs is 24 percent. There is no HP vs. non-HP 
difference for YFs as regards online sales.  
Having start-up experience also makes it likely (but not a logical necessity) to find a higher 
occurrence among HPs of the founders running other businesses in parallel with the current start-up. 
This is the case, and the difference is pronounced. The NF and YF proportions running at least one 
more business in parallel is 66 and 59 percent for HPs, versus only 29 and 21 percent for non-HPs. 
While “regular” start-up activity is approaching gender neutrality (only slight under 
representation of women), “'high potential” start-ups are still male dominated. About 80% of our HP 
interviewees are male. In addition, for all founders there is a high incidence of having parents who also 
ran their own business, but this is even more pronounced among HP founders (67% vs. 57%). We have 
already noted that HP founders are more experienced. All these findings can be interpreted as HP start-
ups requiring more experience, including role modelling/vicarious experience (provided by parents and 
others). As the female start-up prevalence has only recently approached that of men, currently there are 
relatively few experienced female entrepreneurs and role models. 
Overall, the descriptive data suggest our criteria have led to the delineation of a sub-group of 
start-ups that is markedly different from other start-ups and which can with reasonable justification be 
labelled “high potential start-ups”. 
RESULTS 
 
Who starts high potential firms? Teams do! 
 
Both in research and popular media, “the entrepreneur” was for long portrayed as something 
of an omnipotent, lone wolf. It therefore came as something of a surprise when the PSED research 
showed that 50 percent or more of  “nascent entrepreneurs” in a random sample work in a team 
(Delmar & Davidsson, 2000; Ruef, Aldrich, & Carter, 2003.) However, this may also have led to a 
misconception in the other direction, namely that the type of team that dominates textbook expositions 
(e.g., Timmons, 1999) – the highly educated; functionally well balanced team with high growth 
aspirations – is a very common phenomenon empirically. Ruef et al. (2003) showed that a large 
proportion of “start-up teams” consist of romantic partners creating life style businesses and that a 
large proportion of the remainder does not conform to the textbook norm, either. 
 
However, the founders of HP businesses in the CAUSEE data to a considerable extent do 
match the textbook image of entrepreneurial teams. The difference is particularly pronounced when the 
YF category is compared concerning the prevalence of teams consisting of the respondent plus 
members other that than the spouse (or de facto partner.) A full 69 percent of HP-YFs are founded by 
such teams, while only 13 percent of the non-HP young firms have that type of founding team. This is 
a very sizeable difference. By contrast, the proportion of spouse teams is low among HPs. Table 2 
summarises some of the differences. 
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Table 2.  Prevalence of team start-ups 
 
 Nascent Firms (NF) Young Firms (YF) 
 High 
Potential 
Other High 
Potential 
Other 
Started by a team rather than single founder, % 68 47 79 44 
Started by non-spouse team, % 54 21 69 13 
Started by spouse team, % 14 26 10 31 
 
The fact that among HPs the team proportion is higher for NFs than for YFs may indicate that 
HPs started by teams are more likely to get operational and survive the first, critical years (Ensley 
Pearson and Amason 2002.) The higher incidence of teams among HPs is in part driven by the 
education and experience criteria for inclusion as HP. All else kept the same, a team will have more 
human capital than a single founder. However, the full magnitude of the group difference, and in 
particular the spouse-team vs. non-spouse team pattern, cannot be explained as an artefact of the 
sampling criteria.  
 
How are high potential start-ups initiated? 
   
It is commonly believed that business founders first decide that they want to go into business 
for themselves; that they want to start a company. They are then assumed to search for and evaluate 
several alternative business ideas before they settle for one, which they develop further and eventually 
create their business around. Bhave (1994) found that an alternative process was also common. In this 
second model it is a specific opportunity rather than a long nurtured dream that triggers the decision to 
found a firm. Consequently, no search for alternative business ideas is involved; either a start-up is 
attempted around the one, triggering opportunity or no start-up is attempted.   
 
In a previous report we showed that CAUSEE data suggest the latter, “business idea as 
trigger” process is much more common than is the sequence where the decision to start a business 
comes first (Davidsson et al., 2008.) As shown in Table 3, somewhat surprisingly the HP founders 
even more emphasise the idea rather than the wish to start a business as the trigger.  The difference to 
other firms is sizeable, especially for YFs. 
 
Table 3.  Trigger of start-up process 
 
 Nascent Firms (NF) Young Firms (YF) 
 High 
Potential 
Other High 
Potential 
Other 
The specific idea for the business came first 67 47 60 34 
The decision to start a business came first  13 16 21 25 
Both together 21 37 20 41 
 
However, these results should be interpreted keeping in mind the high levels of experience 
and parallel running of other businesses of the HP founders. Bhave (1994) arguable sketches two 
routes for a previous non-entrepreneur to switch to self-employment. Some nurture a dream of running 
their own business; actively seek and evaluate opportunities for doing so, and eventually take the leap 
when they have found an attractive enough business opportunity. Others have no intention to become 
self-employed but drift into that when they stumble over an opportunity that makes this a logical career 
choice. The CAUSEE data seem to suggest that often neither of these apply for HP start-ups. Rather, 
we are dealing with experienced entrepreneurs who are not determined to start another business or 
actively looking for opportunities to do so. They may instead be fully occupied with other ventures or 
having intended to retire. However, when coming across an opportunity that appears attractive they are 
willing to give it a go. Importantly, if this interpretation is correct it also means that they will be quite 
willing to give it up if it does not seem to deliver on the initial promise (cf. Gimeno, Folta, Cooper, & 
Woo, 1997.) This is unlike novice founders of start-ups with lower potential who may cling to the not-
so-promising start-up. Future waves of CAUSEE data collection will show whether HP founders are 
more prone to terminate the start-up attempt. 
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Perceived competitive advantages  
  
Parts of the CAUSEE data collection takes the Resource-Based View (RBV) as its vantage 
point (see, e.g., Barney & Arikan, 2001.)  This theoretical perspective holds that the key to competitive 
success lies in the creation, identification and exploitation of the firm’s unique (and preferably 
sustainable) resource advantages.  
  
Considering their larger infusions of human and financial capital it may be viewed as self-
evident that HPs would report more perceived competitive advantages. However, for at least two 
reasons – one methodological and one substantive – such a result is not obvious. The methodological 
reason is that more experience founders – which HP founders are – may be more realistic about their 
advantages and disadvantages relative to competition and therefore report less exaggerated responses. 
The substantive reason is that even if HPs are better resourced they are also likely to operate in much 
tougher competitive environments, so relative to their competition their position could well be weaker 
than that of non-HP firms.  
Table 4.  Perceived resource advantages 
  
  Nascent Firms (NF) Young Firms (YF) 
  High 
Potential 
Other High 
Potential 
Other 
 Overall average  4.2  4.0  4.1  3.9 
          
 Uniqueness of Produce / Service  4.7  4.3  4.6  4.0 
 Industry Knowledge  4.2  3.9  4.1  3.7 
 Marketing   3.6  3.3  3.7  3.3 
 Technical Expertise   4.3  4.0  4.2  3.9 
 Flexibility   4.5  4.4  4.5  4.3 
 Cost advantages   3.8  3.8  3.9  3.7 
 Use of Networks  4.0  4.0  3.9  3.7 
 Difficulty of other firms to copy key advantage  3.4  2.8  3.6  2.8 
 Difficulty to overcome key disadvantage 2.7 2.7 2.9 3.0 
 Note: All entries refer to group averages on 5-point scales. 
 
As shown in Table 4, the HPs do report more resource advantages than do non-HPs. We may 
also note that the high averages indicate considerable optimism in both groups. Considering 
characteristics reported earlier it is not a surprise that HP founders report more advantages in terms of 
product uniqueness, industry knowledge and technical expertise. The marketing advantage is not 
surprising given the HPs reported marketing experience. However, considering that the competition 
may be large firms it is somewhat surprising that this perceived advantage is of similar magnitude as 
those others just reported. Conversely, flexibility (hardly a “resource” but possibly a source of 
competitive advantage) is a typical small/new firm advantage, but only for YFs is there a significant 
difference between HPs and non-HPs.  
 
It should be noted that the reported differences of 0.2 to 0.5 on a five-point scale are 
statistically significant but substantively not very large. The modest differences may be due to HPs 
facing a tougher competitive environment, as argued above. This could explain the otherwise 
surprising (in the light of their greater experience and incidence of team start-ups) lack of difference 
for use of networks. That HPs do not rely primarily on cost advantages is hardly surprising. It may be 
noted, though, that at least one comprehensive study suggested that to maintain their success, 
innovative “first movers” need to develop cost advantages (Durand & Coeurderoy, 2001.) 
 
As regards sustainability of advantage a large difference was found for the perceived degree 
of difficulty for other firms to imitate the focal firm’s key advantage. However, this difference is to be 
expected considering the higher frequency of IP protection among HPs. There is no difference between 
HPs and non-HPs in the reported difficulty to overcome key disadvantages. 
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HP businesses take longer/are harder to get up and running 
 
An important part of the CAUSEE questionnaire investigates what “gestation activities” have 
already been undertaken, and when. This information is available only for Nascent Firms because 
Young Firms would presumably have completed all relevant gestation activities. A comparison of 
between HPs and non-HPs for this package of questions is telling. 
 These results are reported in Table 5.  
Table 5.  Completion of gestation activities 
 
 Nascent Firms (NF) 
Gestation Activity (% “yes”) 
 
High Potential Other 
Activities with higher completion rate for HPs  
Business formally registered 75 55 
Legal form established 83 65 
Marketing efforts commenced 65 50 
Proprietary technology developed [HP criterion] 50 8 
Applied for IP protection [HP criterion] 48 6 
Prepared written business plan 54 23 
Competitor analysis 81 64 
Assessed market opportunity 87 62 
Financial projections 72 43 
Assessed regulatory requirements 75 60 
Opened bank account 66 39 
Sought external funding 39 16 
Received external funding 31 11 
Established supplier credit 32 22 
Started work full time for venture (any founder) 67 35 
Hired employee(s) 38 11 
Retained accountant 70 45 
Retained lawyer 56 12 
Joined trade association (for this start-up) 25 16 
Contacted assistance organisation (ditto) 59 32 
Joined business network (ditto)  21 11 
Business contactable via phone and/or email 84 73 
Registered for ABN 74 66 
Registered for GST 61 35 
Registered for PAYG 32 15 
Activities with lower or equal completion rate for HPs 
Product/service ready for sale 43 54 
Purchased/leased major equipment/facilities 45 51 
Received income 40 48 
Attended business class (for this start-up) 49 47 
Arranged liability insurance 36 31 
Joined online business community 27 21 
 
These results clearly show that HPs have on average completed more activities. To some 
extent this could be because more activities are relevant in their cases (cf. Liao & Welsch, 2003.) 
However, it definitely also reflects that they have been in the start-up process longer. Based on the 
“time stamping” of the activities, the nascent HPs have on average been in the process for 35.5 months 
while the non-HPs have been attempting the start-up for less than 22 months. This is a sizeable 
difference2  At the same time, the data show that despite this the HPs have to a lesser extent reached 
those milestones that are, arguably, the most essential for reaching an operational stage: getting the 
product/service ready for sale, and generating income. The fact that despite having worked on the start-
up for a longer period HPs do not have higher frequencies for acquisition of major equipment/facilities 
or arranging liability insurance is probably also related to not being ready for the market for quite some 
time yet. Some of the other non-differences may be due to HP founders having more prior experience.  
All in all, this analysis demonstrates that HP start-ups take longer time and are significantly more 
difficult to bring to completion. 
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HP start-ups are more internationally orientated 
 
 Table 7 shows that a large share of HP start-ups perceives market opportunities abroad to be 
more attractive than those available in the domestic market. Their sales in foreign markets – in the case 
of NF intended sales – are also much higher than for non-HP start-ups. 
Table 7.  Internationalisation 
 Nascent Firms (NF) Young Firms (YF) 
 High 
Potential 
Other High 
Potential 
Other 
International opportunities more attractive than 
domestic, % 
63 22 51 18 
Domestic opportunities more attractive than 
international, % 
7 44 18 44 
Proportion of (intended) sales generated in 
international markets, % 
37 7 14 5 
Export to Foreign Customers 23 11 50 18 
Export through Australian intermediary 3 4 17 4 
Export through international intermediary 7 3 27 3 
Export through Foreign Office 3 2 12 1 
Export directly to international customers 15 4 30 4 
Import Good / Services 23 14 39 23 
Exchange ideas in person with international 
colleagues 
47 25 50 24 
Exchange ideas with international colleagues via 
phone, email or internet 
67 37 67 35 
Collect written or electronic information from 
abroad about developments relevant to industry 
79 51 79 45 
 
This is in line with our predictions.  However, there is another important observation to be made 
here. This is that despite their high evaluation of international opportunities the actual international 
sales of high potential, young firms are modest – 14 percent of revenue on average. This figure is also 
much lower than the 37 percent international sales that nascent HPs aim for. These results indicate that 
while international opportunities may seem attractive they are not easy to bring to realisation during 
the early life of a new firm. The lower rated attractiveness by YFs compared to NFs also indicates that 
international opportunities may sometimes seem less attractive when firms learn the true investment of 
money and effort needed to realise them. 
Overall HPs are more internationally orientated in all respects. When analysing results collapsed 
across both categories, they are twice as likely to exchange ideas and information with colleagues 
abroad, whether face-to-face (48% vs. 24%) or via IT (67% vs. 36%). Collection of information from 
international (non-person) sources is also much more frequent in the HP group (79% vs. 48%). They 
are almost twice as likely to be importers (39% vs. 23%; YF only) and more than twice as likely to be 
exporters (50% vs. 18%; YF only), either directly or via intermediaries. 
HP start-ups funding patterns are not as distinct as one could expect 
 
We have noted above that, as expected, much more money has been invested in the average 
HP start-up than in its non-HP counterpart. In this section we take a closer – albeit still somewhat 
cursory – look at the funding patterns for HP and non-HP start-ups. More specifically, Table 6 reports 
what percentage in each sub-group uses a range of alternative sources of funding at all, either as a 
minor or a major source of funding.  
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Table 6.  Sources of funding 
 
 Nascent Firms Young Firms 
Funding source (% using as minor or major source) High 
Potential 
Other High 
Potential 
Other 
Personal savings 82 87 76 75 
Personal credit card 48 46 49 47 
Money from another business that the founders’ 
also own 
34 12 19 4 
Government grants 24 7 39 5 
Delayed payment terms from suppliers 20 13 30 16 
Advance payment from customers 14 15 34 21 
Loans from family members 16 14 19 8 
Loans from friends, employers or colleagues 6 6 5 4 
Founders’ personal secured-bank loans 17 17 11 16 
Founders’ other personal loans, overdraft or other 
credit facilities from a bank  
17 16 22 15 
Secured bank loans to the business itself 7 9 13 9 
Other loans, overdraft or other credit facilities from 
a bank to the business itself 
6 7 16 8 
Loans from any other organisation to the business 
itself 
6 4 11 5 
Equity from family members 6 6 19 8 
Equity from friends, employers or colleagues 10 1 12 1 
Equity from other private investors (“business 
angels”) 
17 1 17 1 
Equity from Venture Capital firms or any other 
organisations  
n.a.1) n.a.1) n.a.1) n.a.1) 
1) Due to an error in the data collection procedure this information was not correctly recorded. However, 
we know from ownership questions elsewhere in the questionnaire that 6 percent of the HPs and virtually none of 
the non-HPs had VCs as part owners. 
 
There are two things from this analysis that we find particularly interesting. The first is the 
widespread non-use of many funding sources, even among HP start-ups. Only one source – personal 
savings – is used by a majority of all subgroups, and no other source is used by a majority in any 
analysed sub-group. Further, many sources of funding are used by 20 percent or less of the members in 
any sub-group. The second particularly interesting finding is the relatively small HP vs. non-HP 
differences that are found for many funding sources.  
 
Where these differences are pronounced – for example, government grants and business angels 
– it is a direct consequence of the types of sources that have been utilised for the over sampling of HPs.  
In the randomly sampled part of the HP samples the proportions using these two sources are much 
lower; 5 and 8 percent for NFs, and 15 and 5 percent for YFs, respectively. For many other funding 
sources the HP vs. non-HP differences must be judged surprisingly small given the vastly different 
characteristics of the two groups (see Table 1 and surrounding text). This is perhaps particularly 
pronounced for bank products. Although this analysis is too coarse-gained to establish this with any 
certainty, the limited use of bank products for start-ups in general, and the similarity of use by HPs and 
non-HPs, may reflect that banks are not capitalizing on the start-up business market to the extent that 
they could, and that they may not be segmenting that market effectively in their efforts to serve it. This 
speculation, of course, is assuming that this market could at all be attractive for an actor that has the 
asymmetrical share in upside gain vs. downside risk that is typical for a lender.   
 
The YF vs. NF difference among HPs is also worth noting in this table. It appears that due to 
their increasing funding needs, HPs use a broader range of funding sources over time without 
favouring any particular source very strongly (Table 6a). Interestingly, this also include a non-trivial 
occurrence of equity and loans from friends and family, which sources are less used by other 
categories of start-ups. 
  
AGSE 2009
11
Table 6a.  Diversity of sources of funding & advice 
 
 Nascent Firms Young Firms 
Mean number of funding / advice Sources High Potential Other High Potential Other 
Sources of funding (major or minor) 3.32 2.59 3.92 2.41 
Major sources of funding 1.94 1.47 2.02 1.19 
Sources of advice (major or minor) 5.86 4.57 5.64 4.38 
Major sources of advice 2.05 1.66 1.93 1.33 
 
Finally, it is worth pointing out that even in a sample carefully singled out to represent the “high 
potential” end of the spectrum, business angels and formal venture capitalists are involved only in a 
small minority of the cases. 
 
Use of advisors 
 
 We know that by definition, HPs have higher levels of human capital internally in the form of 
education and experience of the founders. But what about the use of external competence? In a 
previous section it emerged that nascent HPs to a much greater extent had already retained an 
accountant (70 vs. 45 percent) and/or a lawyer (56 vs. 12 percent). The latter, which is a very large 
difference for this type of data, is likely due to the greater monetary stakes involved and the higher 
incidence in the HP group of intellectual property that is potentially possible to protect.  
  
Table 7 provides some further information regarding the use of external sources of advice 
among HP and non-HP start-up. The table is structured in the same way as Table 6, above. That is, for 
each of a range of sources the proportion using it as either a minor or a major source of advice is 
indicated. 
 
Table 7.  Sources of advice 
 
 Nascent Firms (NF) Young Firms (YF) 
Source of advice  (% using as minor or major 
source) 
High 
Potential 
Other High 
Potential 
Other 
Family members 36 53 47 49 
Friends, employers or colleagues 67 64 64 63 
External investors like venture capitalists or 
“business angels” 
n.a.1) n.a.1) 31 7 
Board members other than those categories already 
mentioned 
39 13 26 7 
Bank staff member 19 15 17 12 
Potential/actual customers  67 62 59 54 
Potential/actual suppliers 56 43 35 36 
Chartered accountant 50 38 54 51 
Lawyer 41 18 49 20 
Consultant at government agency or not-for-profit 
organisation 
41 26 36 19 
Independent tax consultant 23 19 17 26 
Other commercial consultant 34 13 33 15 
Internet websites or communities 57 51 53 44 
Other business media (print & TV/radio) 48 40 46 38 
1) Due to an error in the data collection procedure this information was not correctly recorded. 
 
The results show that the higher internal competence of HPs does not prevent them from also 
using external competence to a greater extent than non-HPs. Where there are notable differences 
between the groups they tend to be in the direction of higher usage for HPs. The exception is in the use 
of advice from family members, which nascent HPs are less likely to rely on than are others. 
Conversely, potential suppliers appear to be more important for nascent HPs than for others. Much 
higher use for HPs than others are also found for board members, lawyers and consultants other than 
tax consultants.  
 
AGSE 2009
12
Non-personal sources like Internet and business media are also used more by HPs, although 
the differences here are not dramatic. Bank staff members are reported as advisors by less than 20 
percent of the cases, and the HP vs. non HP-difference is not pronounced for this source of advice. The 
use of the accountant is likewise not dramatically different between HPs and others, but more prevalent 
in all groups. As regards NF vs. YF differences a peculiarity is that board members are used much 
more by nascent firm founders than those running firms that are already operational.    
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this research we have singled out an “elite” category of business start-ups that is 
characterised by having founders with high levels of education and relevant business experience and 
high future aspirations for the business, and being based on business ideas with greater novelty and 
technological sophistication. We call this group of start-ups the “high potential” (HP) businesses. Not 
all members of this group excel on every indicator of the above criteria; however, across the criteria 
they score higher in total than do start-ups not included in the HP category. Only about ten percent of 
start-ups in a random sample meet the minimum criteria for inclusion. 
 
We have compared the HP start-ups with the majority of start-ups that do not meet our HP 
criteria. Many of these non-HP start-ups may excel on some individual criteria; however, in total they 
do not have a combination of human capital, aspiration and technological sophistication that warrants 
inclusion in the HP group. 
 
When we contrast the groups we find the following results: 
x HPs founded by teams 
HPs are very often founded by teams, in particular by non-spousal teams. This difference is 
particularly marked among HP and non HP firms that have reached (and for some time survived) an 
operational stage. This indicates that having a team rather than going solo may be a success factor for 
HP start-ups (Feeser and Willard 1990; Ensley Pearson and Amason 2002.)  
x Reactive vs. Proactive Opportunity Recognition 
HP start-ups appear often to be initiated by experienced entrepreneurs who are not on a determined 
search for new opportunities to start another business, but who are willing to try it out when they 
happen to come across a promising opportunity. This pattern could also indicate that they are prone to 
give up the start-up effort if new information suggests it is less promising than first thought. 
x Longer time in gestation.   
We find clear evidence that HP business are harder to get up and running than are other start-ups. 
Despite having been in the process for a longer time; having completed more “gestation activities,” and 
being run by more experienced founders, the nascent HP start-ups are less rather than more likely to 
have a product or service ready for sale or to have started to generate income (i.e. HP average gestation 
process 35.5. months vs. non HP average gestation less than 22 months).  
x More use of venture capital and angel investment 
Business angels and venture capitalists while almost exclusively engaging with HP rather than non-HP 
start-ups are involved with but a small minority of the HP category (e.g. Angel Investors invest with 
HP firms 17 percent vs. non HP 1 percent).  
x More internationalisation activity  
The HP start-ups are more attracted to international market opportunities. However, there is also 
indication that HPs find it hard to realise these international opportunities to the extent envisioned. 
x Greater use of Outside Advisors. 
Despite their higher internal levels of education and experience, HP founders use outside sources of 
information and advice to a greater extent than do non-HP founders. The largest relative HP vs. non-
HP differences are found for the use of lawyers and commercial consultants other than tax advisors.  
 
These findings are the preliminary results from the first wave for the CAUSEE study and represent 
just a glimpse of the rich academic and practice-orientated output that is expected from the project.  
They are the first steps in defining and developing an understanding of HP nascent and young firms in 
Australia, how they differ from the non HP cohort that makes up the vast majority of the new firms 
created each year. Further fine grained analysis is predicted to develop a more nuanced picture of this 
important cohort and provide practical implications for Governments in the design of better conditions 
for the creation of HP firms, firms who assist HPs in developing better advice and programs in line 
with a better understanding of their needs and requirements, and individuals who may be considering 
becoming entrepreneurs in HP arenas. 
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NOTES 
1 These cases from the pilot round are not included in the analyses presented in this paper  
2 This also means that the proportion of HPs of all start-ups that are initiated during a particular year is 
likely to be less than the approximately 10 percent we have in our sample. This is because the longer 
start-up process the HPs are eligible for sampling over a longer period of time and therefore – in a 
sense – over sampled when a sample of on-going start-up efforts is drawn on a particular date. 
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